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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
This article will discuss five criminal procedure cases decided by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during the survey period. In the
first case, United States v. Andrews, 1 the Tenth Circuit upheld the validity
of a guilty plea attacked on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court held that representation need not be error free, but must be
what can be expected of a reasonably competent attorney. Furthermore,
the court held that the counsel's conflict of interest was not serious
enough to render representation ineffective. The Tenth Circuit, in
United States v. Broce,2 upheld a defendant's right to a double jeopardy
challenge of a charge even after the defendant had entered a counseled
plea of guilty to the charge. In United States v. Hooks,3 the Tenth Circuit
determined that a jury may find a defendant guilty even though only
circumstantial evidence has been presented.
Finally, this survey will examine two fourth amendment cases con-
cerned with privacy interests. In United States v. Remigio,4 the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted the "knock and announce" statute as permitting officers
in possession of a valid search warrant to enter through an open door
without having to announce their identity and purpose. In United States
v. Owens, 5 the court upheld a motel guest's right to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy against a warrantless search. The Tenth Circuit held that
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as enunciated in United
States v. Leon,6 would not be expanded to include a warrantless search.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND VALIDITY OF THE GUILTY
PLEA: UNITED STATES V. ANDREWS
A. Facts
Lee Travis Andrews was arraigned on October 6, 1983, and pled
not guilty to the following charges: conspiracy to transport stolen goods
in interstate commerce, transporting stolen meat in interstate com-
merce, transporting a stolen truck, and theft of meat from an interstate
shipment. On November 7, 1983, the jury was selected and court was
adjourned indefinitely. 7 On November 30, 1983, Andrews received no-
tification that trial was set forJanuary 23, 1984. Andrews filed a motion
1. 790 F.2d 803 (10th Cir. 1986).
2. 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. 780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1657 (1986).
4. 767 F.2d 730 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 535 (1985).
5. 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). This article will not attempt to assess the correctness of the
Supreme Court's decision in Leon.
7. United States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 805 (10th Cir. 1986).
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to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act8 on December 22, 1983, which
was denied on January 3, 1984. 9
Mark Lee, the attorney for Andrews, was planning to leave the prac-
tice of law to pursue pre-medical studies; therefore, in early January, the
defendant asked that counsel be replaced since classes would most likely
conflict with Andrews' trial date.' 0 The court denied the request. A
plea bargain was arranged and Andrews pled quilty on January 23,
1984.11 At the sentencing hearing, Andrews' attorney was relieved of
further involvement. 1 2 No new attorney was appointed for the purposes
of appeal. 1
3
Andrews was ill, on medication, groggy and incoherent for the two
weeks following the sentencing.14 He never received the entry of judg-
ment; nevertheless, he mailed a notice of intent to appeal on March 12,
1984.15 It was received March 27, 1984 at the court of appeals and for-
warded to the district court where it was filed on March 30, 1984. Subse-
quently, Andrews, represented by new counsel, filed a motion for
extension to file an appeal due to excusable neglect. The district court
ruled that Andrews' filing of appeal was untimely, having been filed after
the thirty day extension period.
16
B. Background
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Until Dyer v. Crisp,17 the Tenth Circuit had followed the "sham and
mockery" test articulated in Gillihan v. Rodriguez,' 8 to determine effec-
tiveness of counsel's assistance under the sixth amendment. Most of the
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1982) provides: "In any case involving a defendant charged
with an offense, the appropriate judicial officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall ... set
the case for trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar... so as to assure a speedy
trial .... 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a) (1982) provides: "In any case in which a plea of not guilty
is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the com-
mission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date .
9. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 805.
10. Id.
11. Andrews pled guilty to conspiracy and misprision of felony. In return for the
guilty plea, the government dismissed the other charges, agreed to contact the state in
respect to any other charges, and to not pursue possible insurance fraud. Id. at 813.
12. Id. at 805.
13. Id. Andrews asked the court how to proceed, but his questions were never
answered.
14. Id.
15. Andrews appealed his conviction for conspiracy to transport stolen goods in inter-
state commerce and misprision of felony on the grounds that his rights were violated
under the Speedy Trial Act. He asserted that his guilty pleas did not waive his right to
assert his speedy trial claim, but even if they did, the guilty pleas were involuntary because
counsel was ineffective. Id.
16. Id.
17. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1342 (1980). The Dyer court stated
that "indeed it is our belief that even though courts in this circuit have articulated the
'sham and mockery' test, they have in fact been applying the more stringent 'reasonably
competent' test, and that formal adoption of this standard represents a change in name,"
Id. at 278.
18. 551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); see Note, United States
Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 363 (1985).
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other circuits had been following McMann v. Richardson 19 which pro-
vided the higher standard of reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
20
In Dyer the Tenth Circuit held that "the [s]ixth [a]mendment demands
that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a rea-
sonably competent defense attorney." 2 1 Dyer had petitioned the district
court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming a violation of his sixth amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel in his criminal trial. The
petition was denied and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The court
reviewed the standards used to determine effective assistance of counsel
in the various circuits and determined that the trend was toward the
more stringent "reasonably competent" test.
22
The test presently applied by the Supreme Court for ineffective
assistance of counsel can be found in Strickland v. Washington. 2 3 In Strick-
land, the Supreme Court adhered to the reasonableness test of Mc-
Mann2 4 but elaborated on the requirements, reiterating that the
purpose behind the sixth amendment is to "ensure a fair trial."'2 5 The
Court held that "the benchmark ... must be whether counsel's conduct
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."' 26 The
test for ineffective assistance of counsel is twofold. The court outlined
that: "[flirst, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient .... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient per-
formance prejudiced the defense.''27
According to Strickland, prejudice is presumed when there is actual
or constructive denial of counsel, or when the state interferes with coun-
sel's assistance. 28 Prejudice is also presumed when counsel has an ac-
tual conflict of interest. However, prejudice is only presumed if the
defendant proves that counsel "actively represented conflicting inter-
ests" and "that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his law-
yer's performance. "29
The Strickland Court also noted that review is limited to the record,
and must encompass all of the circumstances contained in the record.
3 0
Scrutiny of the record must be highly deferential to counsel. 3 1 If the
19. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
20. Id. at 770-71.
21. Dyer, 613 F.2d at 278.
22. Id. at 275-78. The court discussed the trend away from the sham and mockery
standard to the reasonableness standard among the various circuits. For a discussion in
support of the fair trial guarantee and movement away from the sham and mockery test see
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1380 (1983).
23. 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
24. McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71.
25. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 683.
31. Id.
19871
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record reflects that the trial court was alerted to a possible disqualifying
conflict and yet failed to make further inquiry, then the case should be




The Tenth Circuit held that as a matter of law Andrews established
that the tardy filing of his notice of appeal due to his illness, was excusa-
ble neglect 33 and that he was entitled to the thirty day extension under
Rule 4(b). 34 The thirty day extension period did not expire until April
2. Andrews' appeal was filed on March 30.
3 5
Addressing Andrew's speedy trial appeal, the appellate court fol-
lowed the ruling in United States v. Gonzalez 36 and held that voir dire con-
stitutes the beginning of a trial for purposes of assessing the seventy day
period under the Speedy Trial Act.3 7 Consequently, a prolonged recess
between voir dire and the commencement of the actual trial is not in the
spirit of the Act and is thus improper. 38 In this case there was a delay of
over two and one-half months between voir dire and the actual trial
date. In holding that Andrews' right to a speedy trial was violated, the
court noted that trial was postponed due to a heavy criminal docket,
legal holidays, and the judge's absence for a judicial seminar. The
Speedy Trial Act specifically prohibits delay due to congestion of the
court's calendar or a judge's schedule conflicts.
39
The court, however, ruled that Andrew's guilty plea waived his
Speedy Trial Act claim. The majority pointed out that it is firmly en-
trenched in common law that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
claims. 40 In order to preserve his speedy trial claim, Andrews needed to
enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving his right to attack the convic-
32. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (The Supreme Court remanded the
case in order to determine if the defendants were denied due process by having an attor-
ney representing conflicting interests. The attorney in this case was being paid by the
defendants' employer who had an interest that conflicted with that of the defendants.).
33. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 806.
34. "In a criminal case the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district
court within 10 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from .... Upon a
showing of excusable neglect the district court may, before or after the time has expired,
with or without motion and notice, extend the time for filing a notice of appeal for a period
not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivi-
sion." FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
35. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 807.
36. 671 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982).
37. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 808.
38. See Gonzalez, 671 F.2d at 444.
39. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 808. "No continuance under paragraph (8)(a) of this subsec-
tion shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar...." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(8)(C) (1982).
40. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 809; see United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795 (11th Cir. 1984)
(right to speedy trial is non-jurisdictional and waived by a plea of guilty); Mahler v. United
States, 333 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1975) (a voluntary guilty
plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses).
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tion on speedy trial grounds.
4 '
Finally, the majority held that Andrews' claim of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel was without merit. 42 The Tenth Circuit noted that the
record showed that the trial judge addressed the issue of a conflict of
interest and that the judge felt Andrews had received very good repre-
sentation.4 3 According to the majority, Andrews failed to show that he
was prejudiced by counsel's representation.
44
2. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Judge Seymour was in agreement with the majority in all aspects of
the case except Andrews' ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 4 5 Ac-
cording to Judge Seymour, there was a possiblity of a conflict of interest
that rendered counsel ineffective, and therefore, following the proce-
dure adopted in Wood v. Georgia,46 the case should have been remanded
for a hearing to determine if an actual conflict existed. 47 If an actual
conflict existed and rendered Andrews' guilty plea invalid due to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, then his speedy trial claim would not have
been waived and the charges should have been dismissed.
48
D. Analysis
Two issues of ineffective assistance of counsel are presented here.
First, in requesting to be withdrawn, counsel actively represented that a
potential conflict of interest existed. This representation should have
resulted in the case being remanded for further fact finding regarding a
potential conflict. 49 Second, had counsel advised Andrews to enter a
conditional plea of guilty, Andrews would have had the charges dis-
missed since he would have retained the right to challenge the charges
on speedy trial grounds.
50
Admission by counsel of a conflict of interest does not create a pre-
sumption of prejudice per se, but prejudice will be found if the defend-
ant can show that counsel's "actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance."' 5 1 Counsel for Andrews "actively repre-
sented" that there was a possibility of a conflict of interest. 5 2 The de-
fendant was never given the opportunity to show that the conflict
41. Id. at 809, 810; FED R. CRIM. P. 1 I(a)(2). The court rejected Andrews' argument
that he preserved his speedy trial claim by moving for dismissal prior to entering a plea of
guilty. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (by voluntarily pleading guilty
upon the evidence of counsel, the defendant avoids trial and all uncertainties that a trial
entails).
42. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 814.
43. Id. at 815.
44. Id.
45. Id. (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
47. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 817 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 811.
50. Id. at 809.
51. Id. at 817.
52. Id. at 811.
1987]
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adversely affected his lawyer's performance. A hearing should have
been held to determine if counsel sought to avoid trial by encouraging
Andrews to enter a guilty plea and, thus, relinquished Andrews' right to
a speedy trial claim.
53
The court asserted that Andrews' counsel's plans to enter school to
pursue a new profession presented a conflict with his representation.
54
Since trial would likely have interfered with counsel's schedule, it was in
counsel's best interest to have Andrews accept the plea bargain and thus
dispose of the case before trial. The question of counsel's conflict of
interest should have been explored more fully since counsel had peti-
tioned the court to be dismissed as counsel.
55
The dissent correctly pointed out that a hearing should have been
held to determine if an actual conflict of interest did indeed exist which
resulted in Andrews' premature guilty plea. At the hearing, the question
of ineffective assistance of counsel could have been more fairly as-
sessed. 5 6 The majority, following Strickland, relied solely on the record
as the basis for their determination that Andrews received effective
assistance of counsel. 5 7 However, the record cannot always be relied on
to show that counsel's assistance was ineffective or that there was actual
prejudice. It may be counsel's ineffectiveness which is the cause for the
absence of these elements from the record. A hearing on the matter is
necessary to investigate more thoroughly any oversights, especially con-
sidering counsel's explicit statements as to the presence of a conflict.
58
Had counsel preserved Andrews' speedy trial claim, Andrews would
not be facing a prison term. The right to a speedy trial is especially
important where, as here, the defendant is incarcerated for the entire
period before the trial due to his inability to raise bail.5 9 In failing to
preserve Andrews' speedy trial claim, counsel denied Andrews effective
representation. The defendant deserved the opportunity to prove that
an actual conflict existed and resulted in his proffering a plea of guilty.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: UNITED STATES V. BROCE
A. Facts
The defendants, Raymond C. Broce and Broce Construction Com-
pany, Inc., were indicted on November 7, 1981 and charged with con-
53. See United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1976); seegenerally Note, Identify-
ing and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United
States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 772 & n.115 (1980).
54. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520-21 (1972).
55. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 805.
56. See generally Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) (due process is denied when an
attorney represents conflicting interests); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (the
trial court failed to take adequate steps in response to the defendant's and counsel's repre-
sentations that a conflict of interest existed).
57. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
58. Andrews, 790 F.2d at 810, 811.




spiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.60 Broce was also charged with
mail fraud.
6 1
A second indictment on February 4, 1982, charged Broce and Broce
Construction Company with another violation of the Sherman Act. Pur-
suant to a plea bargain arrangement, Broce entered guilty pleas to the
two indictments for both himself and for the corporation as its presi-
dent. The corporation received two separate $750,000 fines, one for
each indictment. Broce was sentenced to concurrent two year terms,
plus a $50,000 fine for each indictment.
6 2
One year after entering their guilty pleas, the defendants filed Rule
35(a) 63 motions to vacate their convictions on the second indictment as
violative of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.6 4 The
district court denied relief and the defendants appealed. The district
court decision was reversed by the Tenth Circuit. That opinion was va-
cated and a rehearing was granted in order to determine if the defend-
ants, by pleading guilty, waived their double jeopardy claims and
admitted that two separate conspiracies existed.
65
The Rule 35(a) motions were filed as a result of a decision in a com-
panion case, United States v. Beachner Construction Company, Inc. 66 The de-
fendants in the instant case and the Beachner Constuction Company
were engaged in the highway construction business in Kansas. They
were all indicted on charges of conspiracy to rig bids. Beachner Con-
struction was acquitted on the charge of conspiracy to rig bids on one
particular highway project. After acquittal, the company was charged
with conspiracy to rig bids on a different highway project. Beachner suc-
cessfully challenged the second indictment on double jeopardy
grounds. 6 7 The trial court found that a pervasive conspiracy to rig bids
had been going on for a period of over twenty years. The Tenth Circuit
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Sherman Act provides that:
Every contract.., or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars ifa corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). This statute instructs that:
Whoever, having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud
... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter
or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service ... shall be fined
not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
62. United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 793-94 (10th Cir. 1986).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) provides: "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time herein pro-
vided for the reduction of sentence." A motion to reduce sentence may be made within
120 days after the sentence is imposed.
64. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
65. Broce, 781 F.2d at 794.
66. 555 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983).
67. Broce, 781 F.2d at 794.
1987]
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upheld the trial court's decision in Beachner.68 Unlike the defendants in
Beachner, however, the defendants in Broce were charged simultaneously
with two conspiracies.
B. Background
The Tenth Circuit has traditionally adhered to the principle that a
plea of guilty made intelligently and voluntarily waives all non-jurisdic-
tional defects including alleged violations of constitutional rights. 69
The prohibition against double jeopardy is found in the fifth amend-
ment. The double jeopardy clause protects individuals from the imposi-
tion of unlawful multiple punishments and successive prosecutions. 70 A
defendant is said to have been placed in jeopardy of successive prosecu-
tion, for purposes of the fifth amendment, in jury cases when the jury is
sworn, or in a bench trial when the first witness is called. Once either of
these events occur, a defendant may not be subjected to a successive
prosecution unless he is found guilty, appeals, and is retried.
7 1
In contrast, the prohibition against multiple punishments is statu-
tory. Generally speaking, the double jeopardy clause protects a defend-
ant from being punished twice for the same offense. 7 2 However, a
defendant may receive multiple punishments under two different stat-
utes if multiple punishments are specifically authorized by the legisla-
ture.73 If multiple punishment is not prescribed by statute, the court
must decide if the conduct constitutes a single offense or multiple of-
fenses which deserve separate punishments.
74
The right not to be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense
has been considered a personal right which is subject to waiver. 75 The
Tenth Circuit has held in the past that a guilty plea waives the defense of
double jeopardy. 
76
These Tenth Circuit double jeopardy cases, however, appear to be
68. United States v. Beachner Construction Co., 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984).
69. See Mahler v. United States, 333 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
993 (1965).
70. For a more thorough discussion of the double jeopardy clause and the use of
guilty pleas, see Comment, Ohio v. Johnson: Prohibiting the Offensive Use of Guilty Pleas to
Invoke Double Jeopardy Protection, 19 GA. L. REV. 159 (1984) (hereinafter Comment).
71. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). Other exceptions to the rule
against successive prosecution are invoked when a mistrial is granted at the request of the
defendant, see United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1982), and when a trial is bifurcated
and the defendant is to be tried on a greater or lesser charge, see Jeffers v. United States,
432 U.S. 137 (1977).
72. See Comment, supra note 70, at 164 nn.23-25.
73. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (cumulative sentences imposed in a
single trial do not violate double jeopardy if the sentences are shown to be prescribed by
clear legislative intent).
74. Blockberger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
75. Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1940); see Special Project,
Criminal Law Survey, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1, 500 (1985).
76. Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824, 825 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 865 (1967);
Caballero, 114 F.2d at 547.
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in conflict with a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. 7 7
In Blackledge v. Perry,7 8 the Court upheld a defendant's right to challenge
his plea of guilty to a felony conviction as violative of the double jeop-
ardy clause. Again, in Menna v. New York, 79 which followed Blackledge,
the Court stated that "[w]here the State is precluded by the United
States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, fed-
eral law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the
conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty."'80 The
constitutional right against double jeopardy is intended to prevent the
prosecution from bringing an improper charge and unlawfully subject-
ing an individual to trial, and to prevent excessive punishment.
C. Instant Case
1. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit, on rehearing en banc, decided the case in two
parts. Part 1 discussed whether a defendant's plea of guilty waives a
defense of double jeopardy, and Part 2 discussed whether the indict-
ments legitimately charged two conspiracies. In Part 1, the majority re-
jected the government's argument that an unconditional plea of guilty is
a waiver of the right to assert a double jeopardy claim.8 1 In addition, the
majority rejected the notion that since the judgment was final, collateral
attacks undermine the finality of the conviction. 82 Following the reason-
ing in Blackledge, the majority asserted that if the government had no
authority to file a charge in the first place, then a guilty plea cannot strip
a defendant of rights which are guaranteed by the constitution.
8 3
In Part 2 the majority rejected the government's contention that
since the defendants pled guilty to both charges, they had confessed to
taking part in two conspiracies. 84 Neither indictment contained specific
language alleging that the conspiracy in the first indictment was separate
from that contained in the second indictment. 8 5 The defendants, in
their counseled pleas of guilty, admitted only that their acts constituted
a conspiracy and not that there were two separate conspiracies.
8 6
The majority found that the trial court had made no factual deter-
77. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974).
78. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
79. 423 U.S. 61 (1975).
80. Id. at 62.
81. Broce, 781 F.2d at 795.
82. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the government's argument that the plea bargain
estops the defendants from challenging the validity of the charge. Since the government
would be without authority in the second indictment if there is only one conspiracy, it
cannot raise an objection to the challenge. Id. at 796.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The indictments did not specifically allege separate conspiracies. The second
indictment did not contain a specific charge that the conspiracy itself was separate from
that in the first indictment.
86. Id.
19871
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
mination as to whether one or two conspiracies existed. 8 7 Conse-
quently, the majority remanded the case to the trial court to determine
the number of conspiracies presented by the original evidence at trial.
8 8
2. McKay - Concurring
Judge McKay concurred in Part 1 of the majority's opinion. As to
Part 2, Judge McKay was of the opinion that the record established as a
matter of law that there was only one conspiracy and that the second
indictment was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. 89 He would
have vacated the judgment and argued for dismissal of the second
indictment.9 0
3. Seymour - Concurring in part and dissenting in part
Judge Seymour agreed that the defendants' guilty pleas were not a
waiver of their right to assert a claim of double jeopardy. The judge
disagreed, however, with the broad conclusion of the majority that the
double jeopardy clause is an absolute prohibition on the government to
bring any charges at all.9 1 Judge Seymour argued for retaining a de-
fendant's right to waive his constitutional right against double jeopardy
if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, affirmative and unambiguous. 9 2 He
contended, though, that a plea of guilty is not necessarily a waiver.
9 3
Judge Seymour contended that the double jeopardy clause was in fact
violated, and he would have vacated the second conspiracy conviction.
4. Barrett - Dissenting
Judge Barrett stated that he would have upheld the trial court's de-
nial of relief. He argued that the two indictments were not facially ille-
gal and that the majority's reliance on Menna was misplaced. In Menna,
the indictment was on its face violative of the double jeopardy clause.
9 4
Judge Barrett contended that the Tenth Circuit still has not addressed
whether a guilty plea waives the right to a double jeopardy challenge of
indictments not facially violative.
9 5
87. Id. at 797.
88. Id. at 798.
89. Id. (McKay, J., concurring).
90. However, Judge McKay had no objection to joining the majority opinion and giv-
ing the trial court the first opportunity to review the issue. Id. at 798 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
91. Id. at 799 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 800-802 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Judge Seymour also addressed Judge Barrett's dissenting opinion claiming that
failure to raise the issue below forfeited the double jeopardy claim. Judge Seymour
pointed out that FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) excepts jurisdictional issues from those that
must be raised before trial. A 12(b)(2) motion asserts as a defense that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the defendant. The Supreme Court's opinion in Blackledge makes it clear
that failure to make a Rule 12(b)(2) motion is not a bar to raising a claim of double jeop-
ardy post-trial because the right asserted by the defendant is the right not to be haled into
court at all. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30.
94. Broce, 781 F.2d at 807 (Barrett, J, dissenting); see Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.
95. Broce, 781 F.2d at 807 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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Since the defendants pled guilty to two separate indictments which
alleged two distinct conspiracies, Judge Barrett expressed the belief that
the defendants agreed with the government's contention that two sepa-
rate conspiracies existed. 96 He argued that the defendants waived their
double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty to the two indictments which
were charged as separate and distinct conspiracies. 9 7
Judge Barrett argued that the defendants waived their right to a
double jeopardy challenge by failing to preserve the challenge by a pre-
trial Rule 12(b)(2) 98 motion. In addition, the defendants, rather than
employing a pre-trial motion, could have instead entered conditional
pleas of guilty thereby preserving the right to a double jeopardy chal-
lenge.9 9 Judge Barrett asserted that the trial court's decision denying
the defendants' motion to vacate the second conspiracy conviction
should be affirmed.
5. Doyle - Dissenting
Judge Doyle contended that the defendants waived their rights
under the double jeopardy clause by voluntarily entering pleas of guilty.
Nonetheless, he believed that even if the guilty pleas did not constitute a
voluntary waiver, the pleas of guilty admitted that two separate conspira-
cies existed.' 00
D. Analysis
The double jeopardy clause mandates that no person shall be put in
jeopardy twice for the same offense. The question here is whether by
pleading guilty to two separately charged conspiracies the defendants
waived their right to challenge the second conspiracy as violative of the
double jeopardy clause.' 0 l
The dissenters contended that allowing defendants to attack their
sentences long after their pleas of guilty would undermine the finality of
convictions. They argued that defendants should not be allowed to walk
96. Id. at 808 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The dissent quotes extensively from Kerrigan
v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (lst Cir. 1981). In KertiganJudge Campbell held that by
pleading guilty to two separate conspiracies that appeared facially to be distinct, the de-
fendant accepted the government's theory that two separate conspiracies existed. Judge
Barrett's dissent further contended that the decision reached in Beachner should have no
effect on the validity of the two guilty pleas since it should not have retroactive applicabil-
ity. Furthermore, Judge Barrett expressed his belief that allowing defendants' challenges
to their guilty pleas would undermine the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and
the finality of a conviction and would discourage prosecutors from entering into plea
bargains.
97. Broce, 781 F.2d at 808 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
98. FED. R. CRIM P. 12(b).
99. Broce, 781 F.2d at 813, 814 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 823, 824 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
101. See generally Special Project, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-84, 73 GEO. L. J. 555 n.1755 (1984) (The
government by clever drafting could possibly create multiple conspiracies out of what is in
reality only one conspiracy) [hereinafter Special Project].
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away from a previously agreed upon plea bargain arrangement.10 2 Ac-
cording to Judge Barrett's dissent, the government refrained from pros-
ecuting other charges by the acceptance of these pleas.
l0 3
However, if the bid rigging conspiracy was as pervasive as the
Beachner trial court found, 10 4 then there would appear to be an ongoing
conspiracy which involved many different highway projects. In fact, the
Tenth Circuit held as such in Beachner.10 5 Therefore, Judge McKay's
concurring opinion correctly asserted that there was no need for a re-
mand to determine the validity of the second indictment because it was
void. Even though different highway projects were involved, the bid rig-
ging was part of one continuing conspiracy.'
0 6
The main concern in this case is whether defendants who have pled
guilty unconditionally should be allowed at a later date, even after the
completion of their prison sentence, to challenge the validity of their
guilty plea. Because the double jeopardy clause bars the government
from putting an individual twice in jeopardy for the same offense, the
courts have held that the clause is a bar to prosecution of a constitution-
ally duplicitous charge. 10 7 Hence, a judgment on a duplicitous charge
cannot be final and a guilty plea does not waive the right to sustain a
challenge.10 8 For a court to hold otherwise would allow the government
to act unconstitutionally.
The impact of the Blackledge ruling, as the Tenth Circuit points out
in Broce, is to provide the defendant with the constitutional right not to
be haled into court on a constitutionally duplicitous charge. Thus, a
guilty plea under these circumstances should be invalid as the govern-
ment had no authority to bring the charge in the first place. 109 The
government would obtain an unlawful advantage in plea bargaining
agreements if the prosecution could persuade defendants to plead guilty
102. Broce, 781 F.2d at 811, 821-22 (Barrett, J., Doyle, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 817 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
104. The Beachner trial court found that there was a pervasive conspiracy involving sev-
eral construction companies over a period of more than twenty-five years. Broce, 781 F.2d
at 794.
105. 729 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'g 555 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Kan. 1983).
106. The trial court in Beachner, 555 F. Supp. at 1277, following a three day evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), determined that there
had been a single pervasive conspiracy.
107. See Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978). For a full discussion
on multiple charges and offenses, see Special Project, supra note 101. A constitutionally
duplicitous charge is one which is unlawful because it presents a situation when two
charges have been levied when only one is appropriate. See Broce, 781 F.2d at 796, 797.
108. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974).
109. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-31. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977)
(defendant pleading double jeopardy argues that the government is without authority to
hale him into court). But see United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981) (failure to raise challenge before entry of guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defenses; double jeopardy is a personal defense and not jurisdictional);
Brown v. Maryland, 618 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878 (1980) (plead-
ing guilty after entering into a favorable plea bargain waives right to double jeopardy
claim); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977) (double jeopardy is a
personal right which must be affirmatively pleaded at trial or it will be regarded as waived).
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to the same charge twice, thereby subjecting defendants to multiple
punishments for the same offense. In finding that a guilty plea does not
waive a double jeopardy challenge, the Tenth Circuit upholds an indi-
vidual's fundamental right to be free from governmental harassment
once he has answered a charge.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE: UNITED STATES V. HOOKS
A. Facts
On the evening of July 28, 1984 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Of-
ficer McLerran and his partner observed a pickup truck speeding and
changing lanes without signaling. The officers stopped the truck, and
the defendant, Wallace Hooks, got out of the truck and walked back to
the police car. I1 0 Hooks was unable to produce a driver's license in re-
sponse to Officer McLerran's request. The officer informed Hooks that
traffic citations would be issued and instructed him to sit in the police
car. Officer McLerran frisked Hooks and discovered a checkbook, which
he handed to his partner. "'1 Officer McLerran then asked for the de-
fendant's name and Hooks gave the name Wallace McConnell. McLer-
ran's partner, having looked at the checkbook, noted that it bore the
name Wallace Hooks. Hooks then admitted that he had lied about his
name and the officers put him under arrest." 1
2
Oklahoma City Police Department policy requires that the vehicle
of an arrested driver be impounded. Officer McLerran went to the truck
to take an inventory of its contents. As he approached the truck he be-
came aware of a very strong odor which he recognized as being
phencyclidine (PCP). Inside the truck he found a bottle containing grain
alcohol, a bottle of whiskey, and a quart jar containing a yellow liquid
which the officer suspected was PCP.1 1 3 Hooks was then informed that
he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. After be-
ing given his Miranda warnings, Hooks told the officers that he did not
own the truck and knew nothing about the quart jar found behind the
seat. At this point, Hooks was thoroughly searched. The officers found
a pocket knife and a plastic bag containing a white powder. The white
powder was subsequently found to be bicarbonate of soda, an element
used in the purification of PCP.
1 14
At trial, Officer McLerran testified about the events occurring on
the evening of Hook's arrest. A special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Agency certified the amount of PCP in the quart jar to be twenty-two
ounces with a street value of approximately $10,000.115 He stated that
110. United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1528 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1657 (1986).
111. Id.




115. Id. Hooks was convicted of intent to distribute on the basis of the large quantity of
PCP in the jar.
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the PCP in the jar was eighty-one percent pure and that PCP is usually
sold in quantities of one ounce or less and smoked by placing a small
amount on a cigarette. Finally, he testified that PCP gives off an odor
which makes one "extremely nauseous."
1 16
Hooks presented several witnesses who testified that he was not the
owner of the truck and in fact had borrowed the truck in order to move
some furniture. He had used the truck all day, returned it at five o'clock
in the evening, and borrowed it again around eight o'clock to move a
freezer." t 7 Hooks' mother testified that McConnell is the name on
Hooks' birth certificate but to her knowledge he never used that name.
His wife testified that Hooks used the name McConnell for traffic tickets,
and that she had never known him to use PCP or any other
hallucinogens. 118
B. Background
It is well settled that ajury verdict will be upheld if there is substan-
tial evidence to support the verdict. 1 19 Appellate courts must always
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. 120 The
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Massey 121 explained that the reviewing
court must make all reasonable inferences and credibility assessments in
support of the jury verdict. It is not within the discretion of an appellate
court to make an independent determination of the sufficiency of the
evidence. 122 Further, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia 12 3 set out
the appropriate scope of appellate review. An appellate court must de-
termine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
24
In an appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the
same standard of review applies to both circumstantial and testimonial
evidence. 125 The Supreme Court warned in Holland v. United States 126
that testimonial as well as circumstantial evidence may lead to an incor-
rect result. It is for the jury, therefore, to weigh the evidence and the
jury's reasonable inferences are to be drawn from the evidence.
127
116. Id. at 1527.
117. Id.
118. Id. Despite the testimony of Hooks' witnesses, he was convicted of intent to dis-
tribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982).
119. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d
646, 648 (10th Cir. 1958).
120. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80; see United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th
Cir. 1982); Corbin, 253 F.2d at 648.
121. 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982).
122. See United States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974); Golubin v. United States, 393 F.2d 590 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
123. 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
124. Id.; see Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966).
125. See United States v. Parrott, 434 F.2d 294, 297 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 979 (1971); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1969); Corbin v.
United States, 253 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1958).
126. 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954).
127. SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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Before Holland, the Tenth Circuit had held that in cases based on
circumstantial evidence, a criminal conviction could be reversed if the
evidence was consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.' 2 8
Since the Holland decision, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the reasonable
hypothesis of innocence standard.' 2 9 However, language in subsequent
opinions has indicated that a conviction cannot be based upon circum-




The Tenth Circuit held that there is only one standard of review
that applies in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases and
that the standard of review for testimonial evidence is the same as that
for circumstantial evidence. 131 Following the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Jackson v. Virginia, 13 2 the Tenth Circuit stated in Hooks that "the
evidence - both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom - is sufficient if, when taken in the
light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."1
3 3
In reviewing the evidence, the Tenth Circuit noted that considering
each item of circumstantial evidence by itself would not have been suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction. However, viewed in its totality, with all the
inferences that could have been drawn, the circumstantial evidence was
legally sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 134 The court held that the mere presence of the odor of
PCP in the truck did not establish that the defendant knew it was con-
cealed in the truck. 135 Considering all the other circumstantial evi-
dence, such as the defendant's possession of bicarbonate of soda, his use
of a fictitious name, and the large quantity of PCP possessed by the de-
fendant, the jury could have reasonably believed that the defendant had
the knowledge necessary for conviction of possession of a controlled
substance. '
36
128. Sapir v. United States, 216 F.2d 722 (10th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 373 (1955);
Morgan v. United States, 159 F.2d 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
129. Corbin, 253 F.2d at 649 (the appropriate instruction to the jury is reasonable
doubt).
130. Lewis v. United States, 420 F.2d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Brumbelow v.
United States, 323 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1963); Tyler v. United States, 323 F.2d 711,
712 (10th Cir. 1963).
131. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531.
132. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
133. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531.
134. Id. at 1532.
135. Id. at 1531.
136. Id. at 1532. The majority pointed out that the value of the PCP supported the
jury's verdict that the defendant knowingly possessed PCP, as it is highly unlikely that a
substance of such value would be carelessly left in the truck. Id. Judge Baldock concurred
with the majority opinion with the exception that he regarded the strong odor of PCP in
the truck as establishing the defendant's familiarity with PCP. Id. at 1536 (Baldock, J.,
concurring).
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D. Analysis
Circumstantial evidence can be very damaging and not always relia-
ble. In some cases, however, it can be at least as reliable as direct or
testimonial evidence.' 3 7 In reviewing a jury's verdict, appellate courts
must give great deference to the jury's decision because the jury alone
has had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses at
trial.' 38 Since the reviewing court cannot make an independent deter-
mination of the validity of the inferences and beliefs of the jury, they
must review the record as a whole to determine if a reasonable jury
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'
3 9
The jury verdict will be reversed only if the appellate court finds that a
reasonable jury, as a matter of law, must necessarily have had a reason-
able doubt. 140 The Tenth Circuit in Hooks determined that a reasonable
jury could have found Hooks guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of pos-
session of PCP with intent to distribute.
14 1
The problem in Hooks is one that is pervasive in most cases that deal
with charges of possession of controlled substances. Possession may be
either constructive or actual; proof of possession may be based on nu-
merous factors and does not solely require that the substance be physi-
cally on the defendant, in his home, or in his automobile. 14 2 Mere
presence of an individual where controlled substances are found does
not necessarily constitute constructive possession by that individual.
14 3
The fact that PCP was in the truck driven by the defendant, therefore,
was not sufficient to prove possession. 14 4 But, all of the other surround-
ing circumstances such as Hooks giving a false name, the large quantity
of PCP found in the truck, the purity of the drug, and the substances
used to manufacture PCP that were found on Hooks, correctly served as
a basis for constructive possession.
Proof of possession with intent to distibute requires three elements:
1) knowledge; 2) possession; and 3) intent to distribute.' 4 5 Intent to
distribute may be inferred from possession of large quantities of a con-
137. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139; United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir.
1969).
138. Massey, 687 F.2d at 1354. See text accompanying notes 119-24.
139. See United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 529 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 156 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
140. United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1982).
141. See generally United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100, 1103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 993 (1971) (evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt must be substantial; therefore, it must do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt).
142. Compare United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983) (dominion
and control over a motor vehicle may be sufficient for constructive possession) with United
States v. Moreno, 649 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence where drug is found is not
sufficient for possession).
143. See United States v. Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1065 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Moreno, 649 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353 (5th
Cir. 1973).
144. United States v. Freeze, 707 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1983) (ownership or control
without knowledge will not support a conviction). But see Vera, 701 F.2d at 1358 (knowl-
edge may be imputed from surrounding circumstances).
145. Freeze, 707 F.2d at 135.
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trolled substance with substantial street value. 146 Courts have given
very few guidelines as to what quantity of a controlled substance is suffi-
cient for conviction of possession with intent to distribute. The Tenth
Circuit in Hooks gave this requisite quantity issue very cursory treatment,
assuming that twenty-two ounces of PCP with a street value of approxi-
mately ten thousand dollars is sufficient to support intent to distribute
without further analysis. The court relied on United States v. Gonzalez 147
for this proposition, claiming that no specified amount needs to be indi-
cated. However, in Gonzalez the defendant was driving a car containing
fifteen kilograms of herion valued at approximately $37,500 per kilo-
gram. This amount is far in excess of what was present in Hooks. 14 8
Although it is unlikely that the twenty-two ounces of PCP was in posses-
sion solely for personal use, guidelines as to what constitutes mere pos-
session and what constitutes a quantity sufficient to infer intent to
distribute have not been expressed in objective terms.
The mere presence of PCP in the truck and the odor in the truck did
not establish knowing possession. Faced with all the other circumstan-
tial evidence, the jury could have found that the defendant knowingly
possessed PCP; nonetheless, knowing possession does not constitute an
intent to distribute. More than mere quantity should be required to
prove intent to distribute, especially when only circumstantial evidence
is presented to convict a defendant.
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
A. Application of the Knock and Announce Statute:
United States v. Remigio
1. Facts
The defendant, Patrick C. Remigio, was convicted of unlawfully
conspiring to manufacture methamphetamines and unlawfully attempt-
ing to manufacture methamphetamines.1 4 9 Remigio and two co-defend-
ants had been under investigation for five months prior to the day of the
search. 150 On the day that the search occurred, agents witnessed deliv-
ery to one of the co-defendant's residences of a substance necessary for
the production of methamphetamines.t 5 ! Later, the agents perceived
an odor of ether coming from the premises and, thus, suspected that the
occupants were involved with manufacturing methamphetamines. The
agents then obtained a federal search warrant. 15 2
The agents split into two groups, one group proceeding to the back
146. Id.; United States v. Gonzalez, 700 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. 700 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983).
148. Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1971) (size of containers with-
out proof of monetary amount or of sale was sufficient).
149. United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 535
(1985).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 732.
152. Id.
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of the premises and one to the front. As the agents approached the back
of the residence, one of the co-defendants opened the back door. 15 3 An
agent quickly subdued the co-defendant. The others entered and pro-
ceeded through a second open door into the kitchen announcing "Po-
lice" and "FBI."' 15 4 They did not knock before announcing their
presence.
2. Background
The purpose of the knock and announce statute 155 is to protect the
privacy of citizens against unannounced intrusions by the government,
to ensure the safety of the officers and the occupants of a dwelling, and
to prevent unnecessary property damage. 15 6 There is disagreement
among the circuit courts as to whether an unannounced entry through
an open door, with a valid search warrant, constitutes an unlawful forci-
ble entry, that is, a "break," or whether such entry is permissible.
15 7
The majority of the circuits have held that this type of entry through an
open door is not a "breaking."' 158 The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits have held that entry through an open door without permission is
reasonable under the fourth amendment. 159 In contrast, the D.C. Cir-
cuit has held that any entry without notification violates privacy inter-
ests. 160 The Second Circuit has held that a peaceable entry, though it
may constitute a trespass, is not a "breaking."' 16 1 The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue.
3. Instant Case
In upholding the officers' entry as lawful, the court of appeals noted
that the officers entered the house through an open door in the pres-
ence of one of the defendants. 162 Therefore, there was no need to com-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982). "The officer may break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search war-
rant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when neces-
sary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in execution of the warrant." Id.
156. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d
1, 3, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980) (en banc).
157. See generally United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 204 (1968) ("breaking" means forcible entry); Dickey v. United States,
332 F.2d 773 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 948 (1964) (officers employed a ruse to in-
duce the occupants to open the door - court held no "breaking"); Keiningham v. United
States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (word "break" in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 3109
means to enter without permission).
158. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 732.
159. United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973);
Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Williams, 351
F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 917 (1966).
160. Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Keiningham v. United States,
287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
161. United States v. Conti, 361 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 390
U.S. 204 (1968).
162. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 733.
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ply with the knock and announce statute.16 3
The panel explained that this was a case of first impression in the
Tenth Circuit regarding the issue of whether police should knock and
announce their presence when the residence which they have a warrant
to enter has its door open. The court recognized that a majority of cir-
cuits have found that such an entry is not a "breaking" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 164 Since a defendant was at the door of the residence
when the police arrived and the door was open, the Tenth Circuit chose
to follow the majority of circuits and rule that this entry was not a
"breaking."
4. Analysis
The purpose of the knock and announce statute is well settled. The
safety of the officers and the occupants of the dwelling must be en-
sured.16 5 Where officers startle an individual there is a reasonable pos-
sibility that violence or unexpected behavior leading to unnecessary
violence may occur. 1 6 6 In addition, the statute entitles every citizen to
protection against unlawful invasions into their home.
167
Officers do not need to announce their purpose and identity when
the gesture would be futile. 16 8 Compliance with the knock and an-
nounce statute is a useless gesture when the officers are almost certain
that the occupants of the dwelling are aware of their presence, identity,
and purpose. 16 9 If police can be reasonably certain that all occupants of
the residence who may pose a threat to their safety are aware of their
identity and purpose, then there is no need to knock and announce their
presence.
It is not clear from the facts, however, that such was the case in
Remigio. To ensure the safety of all concerned, the officers should have
requested permission to enter and should have announced their identity
and purpose. 170 The other occupants were apparently unaware of the
officers' presence, and in failing to inform them of their presence the
officers could have endangered themselves and the other occupants of
163. Id.
164. Id. at 732.
165. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1958); State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d
1, 3, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980).
166. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261 (compliance with the statute is necessary
unless the officers are certain that the occupants are aware of their identity and purpose).
167. "The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry
into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application
.... .Miller, 357 U.S. at 313.
168. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261. See also United States v. Lopez, 475 F.2d
537 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 839 (1973)(facts of the case do not support compliance
with knock and announce statute).
169. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 6, 621 P.2d at 1261.
170. Id. at 1259; Sears v. Oklahoma, 528 P.2d 732 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (The of-
ficers knocked and the pressure opened the door. They pushed the door open to enter,
entered, identified themselves and served the search warrant. The officers failed to an-
nounce their identity and presence and to ask permission to enter.); State v. Collier, 270
So.2d 451 (Fla. 1972) (The officers announced they were police and entered. They did not
comply with the statute as they did not knock or otherwise announce their purpose.).
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the house.171 Therefore, in this situation, the purpose of the knock and
announce statute was not adhered to. Knock and announce standards
must be followed in order to ensure that citizens' homes are not unlaw-
fully invaded and that the safety of all concerned is protected. Unfortu-
nately, the Remigio court failed to set forth strict standards governing
future applications of the knock and announce statute. The court simply
accepted the majority position and ignored the potential danger of their
decision.
Although the defendant who opened the door saw the officers ap-
proaching, there is no indication that he was aware of their identity and
purpose. Furthermore, the other occupants of the residence were not
likely to be aware of the presence of the approaching officers. More-
over, exigent circumstances did not excuse compliance. It is unlikely
that the manufacturing operation the FBI assumed to be taking place
could have been destroyed in the short time span that compliance would
have required. 17 2 Although it may appear absurd to require compliance
in a case where one of the defendants is aware that people are approach-
ing, 17 3 allowing increasing exceptions to the rule tends to foster
noncompliance. 174
B. No Good Faith Exception to the Excusionary Rule for Warrantless Searches:
United States v. Owens
1. Facts
Merle Ellis Owens checked into the Pebbletree Inn in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma on September 8, 1983, and paid for a single occupancy
for one night. 175 He failed to check out by noon on September 9, 1983,
and was asked by motel personnel if he intended to stay another night.
At approximately 3:00 P.M. that day, an additional one hundred dollars
was deposited at the front desk as advance payment for the room. 176
On September 11, 1983, motel security became suspicious due to a
high volume of calls to the room. The security officer, an off-duty police
officer, watched the room from 10:30 P.M. until 7:00 A.M. He observed
171. Remigio, 767 F.2d at 732.
172. See United States v. Sabbath, 391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968) (agents had no basis for
assuming the defendant was armed, might resist arrest, or that danger existed). But see
United States v. James, 764 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discusses issue of probable immi-
nent destruction of evidence after police knocked and announced their presence but were
not permitted to enter).
173. Compare Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1965) (Occupant
opened the door, saw officers and retreated. The officers entered without identifying their
purpose and without consent. The court held that consent was not required.) with Hair v.
United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (The defendant opened the door, saw police
approaching, turned and ran upstairs. The officers, without announcing their authority or
purpose, opened the door and gave chase. The court held that the entry was illegal.).
174. Non-compliance could eventually lead to tragic consequences if the police are al-
lowed to barge in with guns drawn. The facts in Hair could have led to one such situation.
Hair, 289 F.2d at 894.
175. United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 147 (10th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 147-48.
[Vol. 64:2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
several people coming, staying only a short time, and then leaving. 177
The officer ran a police check to see if the car Owens was driving had
been stolen. The check showed that the car had not been stolen, but
that the license plate was stolen. 178 The officer again watched the room
from 7:30 A.M. until noon on September 12th.
At this time, a plain clothes officer went to Owens' room and re-
quested that he move his car. When Owens got to his car, he was ar-
rested for recieving stolen property. 17 9 He asked the officers not to
enter his room, because a female companion, Cheryl Jones, was asleep
on the bed and naked. However, the motel manager authorized police
entry into the room for the purpose of removing Owens' companion. 180
The police entered the room, observed Cheryl Jones sleeping, and
saw marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphenalia in plain view. 18 1 The
officers, unsure of how to proceed, considered the situation for several
minutes, called their sergeant and waited for him. Finally, when the ser-
geant arrived twenty minutes later, Jones was awakened, told to get
dressed, removed from the room, and arrested. The officers, without
attempting to obtain a search warrant, made a complete search of the
room and the closed containers in the room. They discovered in excess




Hotel guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their hotel
rooms,' 8 3 and are afforded constitutional protection against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 184 It is well settled that a warrant is required
to conduct a search where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.1
85
There are, however, exceptions to the warrant requirement for
searches and seizures. Unwarranted searches may be justified if exigent
circumstances are present. 186 Following an arrest, the arresting officers
177. Id. at 148.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 148-49.
181. Id. at 149.
182. Id. Owens was subsequently charged with conspiracy to possess cocaine with in-
tent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He was aquitted of
the conspiracy charge.
183. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966), reh'gdenied, 386 U.S. 940 (1967);
see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
184. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164,
reh g denied, 455 U.S. 984 (1982).
185. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964).
186. United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1984) (The defendant shot at the
officers from different places in the trailer; therefore the officers could not be sure if the
defendant was alone. Exigent circumstances justified a sweep search.); United States v.
Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1 st Cir. 1982) (possibility of another armed person inside the hotel
room hiding justified a warrantless sweep search).
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may make a protective sweep of the premises if they have reasonable
grounds to believe the sweep is justified. 18 7 A search of a person inci-
dent to arrest and the area within his immediate control is permitted.
1 88
If evidence is seized in an unconstitutional search it may be sup-
pressed under the exclusionary rule. 189 Historically, there have been
three reasons given for suppression of the evidence under the exclusion-
ary rule:190 protection of the individual's right to privacy;191 upholding
the integrity of the courts by eliminating tainted evidence;19 2 and deter-
rence of police misconduct.1
9 3
Over the past several years, the circuit courts and the Supreme
Court have gradually eroded the broad power of suppression under the
exclusionary rule 194 and the Supreme Court has recently recognized
limited exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Officers acting on the as-
sumption that the search warrant they have obtained is valid, if acting in
good faith, may have the evidence introduced at trial even if the warrant
is later ruled invalid. 19 5 In United States v. Leon, 19 6 a search warrant was
issued based on a faulty affidavit and therefore the warrant was not sup-
ported by probable cause. Leon held, however, that the officers acted
reasonably and with good faith in their reliance on the warrant. Simi-
larly, in Massachusetts v. Sheppard,19 7 the police were unable to find the
proper warrant form, but were assured by the judge that all the neces-
sary changes in the warrant had been made. Although the warrant was
defective, the officers had acted in good faith with a reasonable basis for
their belief that the warrant was valid. Consequently, the evidence was
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Inad-
missibility of the evidence under the exclusionary rule in these circum-
187. The protective sweep exception provides for a brief search to secure the safety of
people in the immediate area. See, e.g., United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (arresting officers have the right to check a suspect's
residence after an arrest even when arrest is outside the residence if police believe others
may be inside and present a security risk); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom, Miller v. United States, 446 U.S. 912 (1980) (seizure of
address books was justified as they were in plain view of officers lawfully in the residence).
But see United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981)
(officers were not justified in conducting a security sweep as the only other suspect was in
custody).
188. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969).
189. United States v. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible).
190. For a brief discussion of the history of the exclusionary rule, see Comment, Crimi-
nal Procedure - Search and Seizure: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - How Should
Tennessee Decide?, 14 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 549, 550-53 (1984).
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961), limited by United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984).
192. Elkins v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
193. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
194. See Comment, United States v. Leon: The Long Awaited Good Faith Exception Has
Finally Arrived, 36 MERCER L. REV. 757 (1985).
195. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984).
196. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
197. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
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stances would not serve the purpose of protecting fourth amendment
rights through the deterrence of unlawful police conduct.
Another limited exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable
discovery rule recognized by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,
198
and adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Romero. 199 Under
this rule, evidence which would normally be suppressed is admissible if
the court finds that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered
through other constitutional procedures. "Inevitable discovery" there-




The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's decision that Owens had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room and in the contents
of the bags found in his room, and suppressed admission of the illegally
obtained evidence. 2 0 1 In overruling the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
declined to expand the scope of the good faith exception to include war-
rantless searches. The court found the exception inapplicable to the cir-
cumstances in the instant case where the officers totally disregarded
repeated opportunities to obtain a search warrant. 20 2 The Tenth Circuit
declined to rule on whether the officers could rely on the protective
sweep exception to the warrant requirement, because this search clearly
exceeded the scope of a protective sweep.
20 3
The Tenth Circuit also found that the inevitable discovery excep-
tion was inapplicable to the facts of this case. There was no evidence
presented at trial of any independent investigation or of facts supporting
a theory of inevitable discovery.
20 4
4. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit was correct in reversing the trial court's decision.
The good faith exception formulated by the Supreme Court in Leon is
couched in terms of reasonableness. Yet, the reasonableness only ap-
198. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
199. 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982).
200. In Nix, the officers transporting Williams talked to him about an impending snow-
storm and the possibility that the body of the slain little girl might never be found and
afforded a proper Christian burial unless Williams directed them to the body. As they
approached the town where the body was located, Williams, without further conversation,
led the officers to the body. Search parties were scouring the area in the counties next to
where the body was found. Testimony indicated that had Williams not cooperated, the
searchers would have used the same techniques in the adjoining counties. This led the
Court to believe that discovery of the body was inevitable. Nix, 467 U.S. at 435.
201. Owens, 782 F.2d at 150.
202. Id. at 152. The officers watched Owens' motel room for five and one-half hours
without attempting to obtain a search warrant. Controlled substances were in plain view
of the officers upon entering the room, and they still failed to obtain a search warrant.
Even after the room was secured and the closed bags were in their possession, no attempt
was made to obtain a search warrant. Id.
203. Id. at 151.
204. Id. at 152, 153.
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plies to police action based on an appropriately obtained warrant. The
Court's decision not to further limit the scope of the exclusionary rule
was in keeping with fourth amendment individual rights and the deter-
rent effect of the rule.
20 5
The government argued in Owens, however, that the evidence seized
should have been admitted because the authorities reasonably believed
that Owens was no longer entitled to the use of the room. 20 6 According
to the manager, Owens' occupancy had been terminated for lack of pay-
ment and, additionally, an unregistered guest was using the room.
20 7
Previous cases have held that when tenancy has expired there is no enti-
tlement to use and no expectation of privacy .208
The government also contended that the officers could have reason-
ably assumed that they were proceeding legally since a motel manager is
free to consent to a search of the room if the tenancy has expired. How-
ever, the officers never obtained permission from the manager to search
the room, much less permission from Owens to search the contents of
closed containers. 209 Although the manager could give permission to
enter the room,2 10 a search founded on such permission could not in-
clude the closed containers over which the manager had no control.
2 11
As the Tenth Circuit pointed out, the officers disregarded several op-
portunities to obtain a search warrant choosing instead to proceed with
a warrantless search. 2 12 Once closed containers are in the possession of
the police there can be no excuse for their failure to obtain a search
warrant.
2 13
If the officers were legally in the room, the drug paraphenalia, mari-
juana, and cocaine in plain view could have been properly seized and
would have given the officers probable cause for a search warrant.
2 14
The room was easily secured and the government provided no reason-
able explanation for failing to follow the provisions of the fourth amend-
ment. 21 5 There is no question that the officers' suspicion that more
205. Leon, 368 U.S. at 919.
206. See generally United States v. Lee, 700 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1122 (1983) (search of hotel room with owner's permission after rental has expired does
not require a search warrant); United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1970) (when
rental period elapses the former tenant has no right to use the hotel room and no reason-
able expectation of privacy).
207. Owens, 782 F.2d at 148-49.
208. See supra note 206.
209. Owens, 782 F.2d at 151.
210. Although the manager had given the officers permission to enter the room and
evict Cheryl Jones, he had not given permission for a search. Indeed, it was probably not
within his power to give the officers permission to search the room, since the Tenth Circuit
held that Owens had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his motel room and the closed
contents therein. Id. at 150.
211. See Lee, 700 F.2d at 424.
212. Owens, 782 F.2d at 152.
213. See Walter v. Unites States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). But see United States v.Jacobsen,
683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
214. Once officers are legally on the premises, items in plain view may be legally seized.
United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d
1057 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982).
215. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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drugs might be found in the room was reasonable; however, that does
not excuse their failure to obtain a search warrant.
21 6
The Tenth Circuit properly recognized that the extension of the
good faith exception to warrantless searches would open the door to the
type of police behavior that the exclusionary rule is designed to de-
ter.2 17 When courts suppress illegally obtained evidence, police are en-
couraged to secure search warrants and to exercise restraint when
considering a warrantless search. Admitting illegally seized evidence
through the good faith exception erodes the constitutional provisions of
the fourth amendment and discourages police from carefully assessing
the privacy interests of suspects. If the good faith exception to the ex-
clusionary rule is to be expanded to include warrantless searches, inno-
cent people may have their privacy rights violated simply because an
officer has a hunch and acts "reasonably" in pursuing that hunch. Pri-
vacy rights should not be infringed upon in this manner.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit embraced a fairly con-
servative path during this survey period. The court was extremely defer-
ential to counsel in reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the validity of Andrews' guilty plea despite
violation of the Speedy Trial Act, whereas in Broce the court held that a
guilty plea was not a waiver of the right to claim a double jeopardy viola-
tion. The court in Hooks showed extreme deference to the trial court
regarding evidentiary matters and allowed a conviction for possession
with intent to distribute to stand with only the magnitude of the quantity
constructively possessed as evidence of distribution. In Remigio, the
Tenth Circuit followed the majority of the circuits and limited the appli-
cation of the knock and announce statute, allowing police to enter with-
out knocking or announcing their presence when a defendant is at an
open door. The court disregarded the rights of a household dweller to
be informed as to the identity and purpose of officers attempting to
enter a private residence when the door is open. However, in Owens, the
Tenth Circuit showed restraint in not further expanding the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. This case is important in that it pro-
tects individual privacy rights and acts as a deterrent to police officers
considering a warrantless search. In the future, it is hoped that the court
will follow the precedents set forth in Owens and Broce in protecting the
rights of the defendant.
Joyce M. Bergmann
216. See generally Irizarry, 673 F.2d at 556, 559 (The officers seized contraband in plain
view, then noticing that a ceiling panel was loose, an officer searched above the panel and
found additional contraband. The First Circuit held that although the officer had a reason-
able belief that more contraband could be found on the premises, no exigent circum-
stances justified the exploratory search without the prior approval of a detached and
neutral magistrate.).
217. Owens, 782 F.2d at 152.
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